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THE LIMITS TO CHANGE IN EAST EUROPE 
By 
Elesha Kay Fetrow 
What does every European need today? "Provided peace 
and security are guaranteed, every European seeks to 
live in an open and prosperous society, in a society 
striving to put an end to injustice and capable of 
offering every individual the opportunity of making the 
most of his Of her abilities while serving universal 
human ideals." 
The world today is an/ extremely complex place. No longer ..:. 
is it set up as a series of independent nation-states. The world 
has been transformed into an all encompassing network of nations 
that rely on one another; nations have become interdependent. 
There are areas, such as the EEC, that are tied economically. 
There are areas, such as ASIAN that are linked, more or less 
socially. There are areas with definite political ties, ties 
which are historical and those which were established to provide 
for community defense. 
It is the above types of linkages which will be examined in 
the following study, specifically the study will focus on the 
relationship between the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc 
nat io ns. An examination will be made of the effects of Glasnost 
a nd Perestroika on the social, economic and political ties which 
hold the area together. 
Typically, the Eastern Bloc nations, are thought of (by the 
West) as being dependent on and of obtaining their directives 
from the Soviet Union. However, by the very premise of 
Perestroika (restructure) those long standing notions could be 
altered. How far will the Eastern Bloc nations go? Is it 
possible for them to depart from the shadow of the Soviet Union? 
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Even more important, is it possible for them to behave more 
autonomouslyX)to follow their own political, social and economic x 
objectives? Should they? In order to evaluate the above 
questions, the countries of Hungary and Czechoslovakia have been 
chosen in order to obtain a broad spectrum for measurement. Both 
nations have experienced their own form of struggle. In 
Hungary, that struggle has continued despite soviet opposition. 
In Czechoslovakia, opposition to Soviet dominance was crushed and 
little remained of Czech liberalizations afterward. It is only 
recently that signs of a Czechoslovak thaw can be witnessed. 
"Ironically, in traditionally heretic Prague, Gorbachev' s fresh 
ideas are still fiercely resisted. 112 
After World War II ended, nations of the world found 
themselves in a unique situation. Gone were the days of National 
unilateral action. In its place, a system of bi-polarity quickly 
emerged. The main actors, the Soviet Union and the United 
States, began to split up the world between them. The Cold War 
had begun and a 'if you are not with us then you must be with 
them' type attitude directed national policy actions. In order 
to understand the effects of Mikhail Gorbachev' s policies of 
Glasnost and Perestroika on Eastern Europe, it is essential to 
first establish the background for those policies. 
The Cold War was a time of international political limbo. 
The Soviet Union was thought, by the United States, as being 
aggressive, at the close of World War II. The Soviet Union 
viewed the U. s. unil a teral reconstruction of Germany as 
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threatening. Each nation reacted to moves of the other. Less 
communication and trust was exhibited. Military organizations 
were formed. Economic and political organizations were also 
formed, with the express purpose of keeping the other side out. 
The United States formulated the containment policy in order to 
disassociate itself and U.S. allies from being effected by the 
1 evils' of socialism. The Soviet Union believed that it was 
being encircled by hostile capitalist nations that wished to 
destroy the Soviet system . Relations grew more hostile, and as 
they grew more hostile attempts were made by both sides to define 
',\ 
Wfre influence could and ought to be maintained. ~ 
An example of Soviet reaction to Western policies was the 
establishment of the Warsaw Pact, 1955. 3 The Warsaw Pact, like 
ATO 
Nato, though supposedly a military defense alliance to protect !( 
and benefit all of the members, was transformed into a political 
tool. It soon became evident that though member countries were 
to be a part of the system, in actuality ~ it meant that Eastern 
Europe would be dominated by the Soviet Union. It was soon 
obvious that Eastern European leaders were not going to be 
allowed to operate autonomously. Instead, it was clearly evident 
that the function of the Warsaw Pact was that of a vast police 
force deployed to safeguard the power of the imperial regime; the 
Soviet Union. Threats to the "leading role of the party" and 
"membership in the Warsaw Pact", brought about an inevitable 
demonstration of Soviet force. 4 
In 1948 the Soviets backed a coup organized by Soviet and 
3 
< 
Czechoslovak Communist parties and established a socialist 
government in Czechoslovakia. 
discontent could be detected. 
In 1953, signs of East German 
In 1956, the Hungary Revolution 
presented the Soviet rulers with the first serious challenge to 
their hegemony in Eastern Europe. The result, the Red Army 
invaded Hungary and ended the mass protests with blood. 5 In 
1961, the Berlin Wall was built, by the Soviets, to stop the 
flood of refugees from East to West Germany. 6 And perhaps the 
most notable episode occurred in 1968, the year of the Prague 
Spring. 
The Prague Spring (1968), though now viewed as the for-
runner of Glasnost and Perestroika, was a crisis for Soviet 
leaders. The socialist Czechoslovak leadership, headed by 
Alexander Dubcek, was working towards reform within the 
governmental framework. Reforms wh.ich were designed to alleviate x 
the eco n omic problems and societal discontent that Czechoslovakia 
had been experiencing. The reforms promoted individual and 
societal freedoms and were committed to political liberalization 
l, 
and economic reforms i itdeas which were contrary to the Soviet 1-
norm. A major problem arose. The Soviets were feeling their 
hold on Eastern Europe slipping which meant that the real risk 
was, if allowed to continue, Czechoslovakia might "infect the 
bloc with the ferment of reform and reorientation." 7 At that 
time, dissention in the •ranks' was not to be tolerated, and the 
Soviet Union with Warsaw Pact troops, once again invaded 
Czechoslovakia and eventually placed pro-Soviet men in the 
4 
government. The sad part of the situation is that Czechoslovak 
leaders believed that they had been acting in accordance to 
genuine socialist principles. 8 
In order to explain why one socialist nation had been 
subject to a socialist invasion, the Brezhnev Doctrine was born. 
The document attempted to reconcile the contradictions of a free 
socialist state and the limits that the Soviet Union was placing 
on that freedom. In actuality, the Doctrine "amounts to denying 
in principle the sovereignty of any "socialist" country 
accessible to the Soviet Union. 119 And it was a blunt assertion 
of the region-wide right to intervene. lO J;t-intervention which 
is currently attributed to the fact that in Czechoslovakia ; as 
elsewhere in East Europe, reforms were proceeding too rapidly for 
the Soviets. Reforms internally and externally which threatened 
or even directly questioned the supremacy of socialism and 
Moscow, have warranted such Soviet action in the past. 
The Soviet Union had deliberately grabbed its portion of the 
world and held it tightly, stepping into the age of power 
politics. To most of the communist parties around the world "the 
Brezhnev Doctrine symbolized the beginning of a period when 
Moscow would not abide by Marxist-Leninism in any consistent way, 
only to use it, or twist it, in an attempt to impart seemingly 
noble motives to its increasingly cynical actions. 1111 
" .... What is the difference between the reform 
program of Mikhail S. Gorbachev and that of Alexander 
Dubcek in Czechoslovakia in 1968? 
12 Answer--Nothing but Gorbachev doesn't know it yet." 
East European Joke 
5 
}f 
Over the past few years, the Western notion of the Soviet 
Union as the 'Evil Empire,' has been dissolving. The idea that 
the Soviet Union is mainly a manipulative, un-feeling, power-
hungry nation, has been fading away. Credit for such a 
'historic' change can mainly be attributed to one man, Mikhail 
Gorbachev, the General Secretary of the Soviet Union as of March 
1985. 
Mr. Gorbachev has had a definite impact on the changes 
taking place within as well as perceptions without the Soviet 
Union. His goal ; a radical transformation of the economic , 
mechanism by the early 1990 's in his country, is a task in 
itself. 13 He is also emphasizing the need for the freeing of 
info r mation, increasing the responsibility of society in society 
and the development and application of new technologies. 
As Gorbachev views it, his plan is not radical. The plan is 
simply a return to fundamental Marxist-Leninist principles such 
a f'. democratic centralism. 14 But why return? Simple, the Soviet 
Uni on, increasingly, over the past few years has found itself 
fall i ng behind in technology coupled with a sluggish economy. 
Gorbachev believes that the old policies, those used by his 
pred e cessors, can no "lo nger change the world [the Soviet Union) " 
for the better. 1115 In order to remain politically 'on top' 
something needed to be done. And as Marxist philosophy dictates, 
change must be made with the economy-the superstructure. 16 
Gorbachev has dedicated himself to the restructuring of the 
Soviet economy. But to catalyze the change, to get society to 
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have a stake in the changes, Gorbachev introduced the policy of 
Glasnost (openness) to supplement his economic changes. 
need to) wake up those people who have fallen asleep." 
"[We 
"To get 
individuals involved in all stages, is the most important aspect 
of what we are doing. 1117 According to Gorbachev, the citizens 
are to wake up and have a positive impact on the economy through 
their own inputs and their criticism. The idea is to open the 
channels of communication within society, allowing certain 
sectors to have more input into the system. Gorbachev, even 
promoted (though as yet limited) the concept of elections within 
the party itself. To unite socialism with democracy has been a 
major theme which has threaded its way through many of 
Gorbachev's speeches and publications. 
Interestingly, Soviet liberalization at home, as was 
suggested by the Eastern European joke above, has been following 
similar approaches to those taken in Hungary 1956, and in 
Czechoslovakia 1968. If that is so, then it should be re-
emphasized that those liberalizing movements were stopped and if 
history were to repeat itself, one could conclude that new 
liberalizations would also be stopped. A wait and see type 
attitude is the consensus of East European leaders. They want to 
be sure that Gorbachev is earnest and !:f he is successful, before ~ 
putting themselves completely on the line. East European leaders 
fear the return of Soviet direct domination and brutality, 
Therefore, East Europe waits. But pressures in their own 
countries are building ~; pressure5 which can be 
7 
attributed directly to how East Europe has been structured-Soviet 
style. East European leaders have inherited economic structures 
that have not been developing spontaneously, but have been 
developed on the basis of theoretical concepts and plans which 
originated from Moscow. 18 Serious economic and social problems 
have been the result, and they must be dealt with in Eastern 
Europe soon. 
1 
Hungary, perhaps the most progressive of its East European ~ 
neighbors, claims to have begun to enjoy the effects of Soviet 
glasnost. It appears that glasnost in the Soviet Union has made 
it easier for Hungary to make changes, changes that otherwise 
could not have been accomplished. Regardless of the reasons, the ) 
process of change has begun. 
Janos Kadar, in the spring of 1988, began the process of 
loosening the economic and political controls, which he says was 
designed to "make the people happier." 19 However, more changes 
are still necessary . How necessary? Hungary today has the 
largest per capita foreign debt in the socialist bloc. They have 
a trade defic i t of .4 billion dollars. 20 Inflation has reached 
17% and unemployment (in a socialist state) has reached 3.3% and 
i s e xpected to go as high as 13% with new austerity measures. 21 
The problem, apart from economic mismanagement, is that 
"Hungarians want a great deal from abroad and they have virtually 
nothing to offer in exchange. 22 The Hungarian people want 
~ 
( desperately to improve their standard of living and most citizens 
have two jobs. But the Hungarian standard to be attained, as 
8 
compared to the rest of the socialist bloc, is based on Wester n 
,\-
European standards. Th~ standard -wh.i.Gh is higher than the rest 
of the bloc and causes more societal dissatisfaction with the 
system, which leads to more pressure to change being placed on 
the government. 
Besides a marginal amount of societal liberalization, 
several reforms have been instigated in an attempt to get the 
economy moving again. Perhaps the two most original reforms for 
any socialist country~ can be found in the new Hungarian banking 
system and the Hungarian experimentation with a stock exchange. 
Banking has taken on a new meaning. No longer is it 
possible for the government to obtain money for short-term, non-
profitable venture, such as the governmental subsidization of 
primary consumer goods. Money now must make money. The money 
must now be used to turn a profit, and innovation and inventions 
are now being heavily invested in. 23 The position of the 
enterprise has also changed. Enterprises are now being allowed 
to go bankrupt rather than having banks being forced to bail the 
enterprise out. 
The other reform, a direct experiment with capitalism , has 
been the creation of the Hungarian stock exchange. Though 
relatively new and its directors are still inexperienced, the 
operation seems to have been a success. 24 
Perhaps, the most beneficial outcome of the reforms ( and 
glasnost) in Hungary, has been the "new spirit of the ·people . 1125 
Independent trade unions have been formed, wild cat strikes have 
9 
been called 26 and as one author put it after a recent visit to 
Budapest, "I felt that I was in a more or less free country. 1127 
Society has begun to organize into new groups in order to 
pla c e pressure on the government for change. The result has been 
the erosion of the monopolistic power that has been held by the 
communist party ) 28 J; result which would not have been allowed 
under Brezhnev1 s leadership. Not only have groups been forming 
around economic issues, but society has produced a number of 
political groups as well. 
returning. 
Hungarian pluralism seems to be 
The pressure for change has not strictly come from the 
people. Several government officials are pushing for more change 
as well. As one Hungarian Politburo member, Will Pozsgay, put 
it, "we want to show ourselves as a model, as a laboratory for 
changes. 1129 The governmental leadership has even been changing 
to reflect such an at t itude. Early last fall, Janos Kadar 
stepped down, so Grosz, a reform minded leader, could lead the 
way. 
Changes are definitely taki ng place within the socialist 
bloc ; however, not all socialist countries are so acclimated to , 
change as Hungary. Czechoslovakia, though not wanting to be 
perceived as being behind the times, has been moving toward 
reform at a very cautious rate. Reports are that the country is 
still traumatized by the Soviet invasion that ended the 1968 
Prague Spring. Furthermore, up until December 1987, 
Czechosloval<ia was still presided over by the Brezhnev installed, 
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75 year old Gustav Husak-a man who has held tight control over 
Czechoslovakia for nearly 2 o years. However, the new Czech 
leader, Milos Jakes, should be held suspect of moving towards 
actual reform since his political career has been noted for the 
"erasing of reform. 1130 
Following the go ahead given by Gorbachev, modest economic 
reforms have been made such as a loosening of excessive economic 
centralization. Enterprises are being allowed a little more lee-
way, "making them accountable, self-financing and self-
managing." 31 "Workers will be electing their management from 
among competing candidates and will help decide development 
strategies and distribution of profits. 1132 Such a policy closely 
parallels the reforms in the Soviet Union. 
Social changes however, are moving even slower. Presently 
there is no plan for implementing any social changes. Pluralism 
is not to be permitted in any form. No force which would be 
against socialism will be allowed to exist. The national media, 
as of yet, has remained unchanged and boring. 33 
Czechoslovakia presently has a staunch leadership which is 
unlikely to push reform but Czechoslovakia has an even larger 
obstacle to real reform. The economy is in such bad shap~, that 
even if true liberalizing reforms were used terrible problems 
would occur. A dramatic drop in societal living standard and ,{\,, ~ 
wages, 1 inflation and unemployment would rise are but a fe w of the , 
consequences of liberalization. 34 To give a dramatic example of 
the consequences of liberalization, it is calculated that if 
11 
central planning were dismantled, -t:h-at 3 0% of the smokestack 
industries would have to be closed, 35 roughly the equivalent of 
30% of U.S. steel production being closed. 
immense on the economy and society. 
The impact would be 
As was stated previously, there was/is pressure being 
placed on socialist leaders for change throughout the Soviet 
Union and the Eastern Bloc. In the Soviet Union, Gorbachev has 
proclaimed the old [Stalinist] model of the economy and society 
a~ somewhat naive., 
/ 
H . . ,)raive in the sense that the system " 
overlooked too many aspects of social and economic realities. 36 
These realities enable capitalist countries to become more 
ic advanced and prosperous, while socialist countries f ,ell into -" 
economic stagnation and decay. 
Changes are being implemented in order to take care of some 
of those problems. For instance, mass input into decision-making 
p r ocesses is be i ng encouraged in the Soviet Union. Individuals 
are being allowed to s peak their minds and criticize activities 
and plans that they dee m as disagreeable. Economic poli ci es are 
bei ng implemented t hat should promote growth within the economy. 
However, though the changes seem to be headed in a positive 
di r ection ,) even positive changes can cause serious problems to 
arise in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe. 
The dilemma for Gorbachev is that to gain any amount of 
progress he must allow certain freedoms to exist without those 
freedoms becoming detrimental to his purpose. For instance, in 
t he past genuine economic and social changes of the system 
12 
J( 
induced an element to arise that was not viewed as positive. 37 
With the increased acceptance of criticism, the state becomes 
subject to the extreme criticism of those that totally object to 
and are dissatisfied with the system as a whole; thus an element 
of pluralism has been created. 
Another problem that Mr. Gorbachev is facing is an unstable 
economy. 
have not 
As yet, the economic changes that have been implemented 
caused a real measure of 
living standards have not been 
dissatisfaction has been the outcome. 
economic growth. Societal 
perceivably raised-societal 
All of the social and economic problems that are felt within 
the Soviet Union, are being experienced to a greater degree in 
Eastern Europe and more. The Soviet Union has some rather 
obvious advantages over Eastern Europe in dealing with those 
problems. One advantage is the relatively large Soviet economy. 
This means that since the Soviet economy is so large, and has so 
many resources to draw from, that economic structural problems 
are not as obvious nor as easily felt by society as in Eastern 
Bloc countries. Furthermore, since the Soviet economy is so 
large, it is not dependent on trade from it's satellites. 
However, the satellite nations are extremely dependent on the 
Soviet Union for trade as well as economic assistance. 
Socially, the same problems that are felt in the Soviet 
Union are felt by East European countries, except in most cases 
the problems are compounded. Pluralistic tendencies are even 
more obvious and more easily established within East Europe since 
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the nations are so much smaller and most of them have had recent 
experience with pluralistic tendencies. 
The whole barrage of problems simply encourages the dis-
unification of the area, so why does the area stay together? 
After all, Gorbachev has intimated that each country must exist 
under absolute independence, where each individual party (nation) 
has the sovereign right to decide its direction. 38 Does the area 
stay together simply out of habit? Or is there some type of 
regional integrity that is silently being upheld? 
Though Soviet tanks, armies and other machines of war are 
still stationed throughout Eastern Europe and give some 
legitimizing support to the communist regimes in Eastern Europe, 
Gorbachev knows that some way other than force must be used if 
the area ..:r is to be maintained. 
contribute to the areis cohesiveness. 
Three Soviet influences A 
First is that change is 
being promoted by Moscow, therefore any reforms within Eastern 
Europe are perceived as being due to example rather than by 
pressure. 39 Second, Gorbachev is promoting the idea of a more 
independent East Europe. This strategy not only gives 
credibility to Gorbachev's rhetoric but it quite tactfully allows 
the Soviet Union to suggest that the nations should also become 
more economically independent and should not be dependent on the 
Soviet Union to bail them out of economic problems. This policy 
would also, if effective, allow Soviet troops to be withdrawn ,-7 
from Eastern Europe-a practice · that has become increasingly more 
expensive. 40 Third, Gorbachev influences East Europe through 
14 
consultation. Mr. Gorbachev on a regular basis consul ts with 
East European leaders in order to obtain their input into matters 
of joint concern. This policy allows socialist leaders to seem 
to have more autonomy and to feel that they have a stake in the 
outcome of a joint effort and ultimately remain supportive of 
Soviet policies. 41 
Within East European countries, most leaders still cater to 
the whims of the Soviets. In fact most still bless and fear the 
Soviet military presence that has been stationed throughout the 
area. Leaders bless the military presence since it lends an 
extra amount of legitimacy to their own governments. Yet they 
fear the military for the retaliatory memories that it still 
embodies. 42 However, cautious as well as bold steps towards 
reform have been made by most East European leaders. 
In all cases, the first phase towards any reform has been to 
obtain Soviet approval before making any radical changes. 
Approval must be obtained in order to prevent a repeat of Soviet 
direct intervention. 43 The second phase of reform is to 
coordinate reform goals to the normative (socialist) goals 
already held. 44 
In order for the socialist countries to once again flouri sh 
economically and socially, a balance must be made. Socialist 
leaders must reconcile their own position within the political 
framework and the ideal which they embody with the means of 
refo rm which most deem necessary to promote progress. 
For Hungary, the reconciliation process has proven quite 
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successful. Hungarian leaders have maintained a marginal amount 
of reform since the Soviet intervention of 1956. Thus, the 
transition to an even more reform minded society has been 
relatively easy. However, in Czechoslovakia the government still 
clings to the Brezhnev legacy of fear and coercion which has 
lingered on since 1968. Therefore, any reforms which are 
attempted are not wholeheartedly made by the government nor are 
they wholeheartedly supported by the society. 
The relationship is simple, : there remains a dominant nation, 
the Soviet Union, which promotes economic and political reforms 
within its own country and promotes reform in the Eastern bloc in 
order to advance Soviet goals. By promoting reform in Eastern 
Europe, Gorbachev gains two of his goals. Gorbachev obtains a 
positive world and national perception of himself as a true 
reformer. The second goal )< is drawing the Eastern bloc more 
closely under the direction of the Soviet Union and at the same 
time make the countries less dependent on the Soviet Union 
economically. That way Gorbachev gets to manipulate the area 
without paying all of the costs. The question is, how long can 
such a relationship exist? Once East Europe realizes that the 
costs of even more extensive and radical reform measures are not 
as expensive as they were in the past, will the bloc break? 
Presently, Eastern Europe is a group of small, disorganized 
nations with similar backgrounds and mutual alliances, heavily 
influenced by the Soviet Union. What if that were to change? 
What if the nations were to organize, especially under the banner 
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promoted by Gorbachev (a philosophy which has a perceived goal of 
undermining the NATO alliance), a common European home? Such 
actions would surely enhance the situation of East European 
leaders. It would give them more latitude to maneuver and deal 
with their individual national situations. Furthermore, if 
collective organization could be achieved throughout Eastern 
Europe ~ ::t(international balance would then be shifted away from ;, 
soviet domination of the area. 
East European nations are beginning to realize that they are 
a..,, C) ' 
a part of a multilateral worl':J _,,k' world that included- the inter-
linkages of economies and often times societies. They have begun 
to realize that in order for their own nations to survive, 
dependence cannot and should not be placed on the Soviet Union. 
They must act on their own behalf in their own self interests. 
This implies that if the trend continues, East Europe will in 
ti me begin to develop real autonomy. However, East Europe does 
not feel that it is ready to go it entirely alone. There is some 
pressure being placed on the West to fill the economic void which 
has been left by Moscow, pressure for the West to under-write the 
inefficient East European economic systems. If such is the case, 
several outcomes could occur. The Soviet Union, as in the past 
could interfere and once again forcefully claim the area. Or, if 
Western influences are to be allowed and Western money is to be 
used to support the East European governments, then certain 
changes are inevitable. Europe will more likely become a common 
home to all of its countries, and as such the area will likely 
17 
become more homogenous in its make-up. East European attributes 
will likely be transferred onto Western Europe, but it is more 
likely that Eastern Europe will incorporate more West qualities. 
There are many issues which are encompassed in the principle 
of East European reform, several of which have been included 
above, but there is more. There are many possible outcomes for 
East Europe, the problem is in finding the correct set of inputs 
to formulate the "optimal" outcome. So far East Europe seems to 
have been given the go ahead for making major changes in their 
established economic and social structures, but they move slowly. 
Slowly out of fear of retribution and perhaps slowly so East 
European leaders can find their own place in their countries, and 
their countries can find their place in the new order of the 
world. 
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